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ARTICLE
The eﬀectiveness of school-based decision making in improving
educational outcomes: a systematic review
Roy Carr-Hilla, Caine Rolleston a, Rebecca Schendela and Hugh Waddingtonb
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ABSTRACT
The rhetoric around decentralisation suggests school-based manage-
ment improves education outcomes. Existing reviews on school-based
decision-making have tended to focus on proximal outcomes and oﬀer
very little information about why school-based decision-making has
positive or negative eﬀects in diﬀerent circumstances. The authors sys-
tematically searched for and synthesised evidence from 35 quantitative
and qualitative studies evaluating 17 individual interventions on the
eﬀectiveness of school-based decision-making on educational outcomes.
Devolving decision-making to the level of the school appears to have a
somewhat beneﬁcial eﬀect on dropout, repetition and teacher atten-
dance. Eﬀects on test-scores are more robust, being positive in aggre-
gate and for middle-income countries speciﬁcally. On the other hand,
school-based decision-making reforms appear to be less eﬀective in
communities with generally low levels of education, where parents
have low status relative to school personnel. The authors conclude that
school-based decision-making reforms are less likely to be successful in
highly disadvantaged communities.
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Background
Education is understood to be a fundamental human right that oﬀers individuals the opportunity
to live healthy and meaningful lives. Evidence from around the world also indicates that education
is vital for economic and social development, as it contributes to economic growth and poverty
reduction, sustains health and well-being and lays the foundations for open and cohesive societies
(UNESCO 2014). In recognition of the vital importance of education, governments across the globe
have made a substantial eﬀort to expand and improve their education systems, as they strive to
meet the Education for All goals, adopted by the international community in 1990. These eﬀorts
have borne remarkable results; it is estimated that the number of out-of-school children has halved
over the last decade (UNESCO 2014, 53). However, there are still serious barriers to overcome,
particularly in terms of access, completion and learning (Krishnaratne, White, and Carpenter 2013).
Access to education – particularly for girls, poor children and children in conﬂict-aﬀected areas –
remains a crucial issue.
The devolution of decision-making authority to schools has been widely adopted as a decen-
tralisation model by international agencies, including the World Bank, the US Agency for
International Development and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and by
governments, as it is assumed that locating decision-making authority within schools will increase
accountability, eﬃciency and responsiveness to local needs (Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina
2008). This devolution includes a wide variety of models and mechanisms, diﬀering in terms of
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which decisions are devolved (and how many), to whom decision-making authority is given and
how the decentralisation process is implemented (that is, through ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’
processes). All models and mechanisms are presumed to increase responsiveness to local needs
and accountability by bringing community members into direct contact with schools, and to
increase eﬃciency by making ﬁnancial decisions more transparent to communities, reducing
corruption and incentivising investment in high-quality teachers and materials.
However, there is limited evidence from low-income countries of the general relationship
between decentralisation reforms and education outcomes. Much of the literature focuses exclu-
sively on the proximal outcomes of school-based decision-making. This is likely due to the relative
ease of measuring such outcomes, as well as the shorter time generally required to identify impact
on intermediate outcomes.
Existing systematic reviews on school-based decision-making have also tended to focus on
proximal outcomes (for example, Guerrero et al. 2012; on teacher absenteeism; Petrosino et al.,
2012; on student enrolment). There are very few that consider the full range of relevant outcomes,
such as student learning (for example, Snilstveit et al. 2015). The comprehensive reviews that do
exist (Santibanez 2007; World Bank 2007; Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2012; Westhorp, Walker, and
Rogers 2014) are not systematic reviews as commonly deﬁned, with clear inclusion criteria,
systematic literature searches and transparent appraisal and synthesis of the evidence.1 Most of
the reviews rely on literature that is now nearly ten years out of date and focus almost exclusively
on Central America, referencing almost no evidence from other regions. Existing reviews on this
topic also tell us very little about why school-based decision-making has positive or negative
eﬀects in diﬀerent circumstances, a gap which this review also aims to address. There is, therefore,
a need for a current globally comprehensive systematic review of the impact of school-based
decision-making on a wide range of educational outcomes.
In the following sections, we deﬁne school-based decision-making interventions and how they
are supposed to work. We then present the review objectives and methods, followed by synthesis
of evidence on eﬀects and discussion of the mechanisms underpinning positive and negative
eﬀects. Finally, we give implications for policy, programmes and research.
School-based decision-making reforms
Decisions about curricula, ﬁnance, management and teachers can all be taken at one or more of
several administrative levels: centrally at the national or federal state level, by provinces/regions
within a country, by districts or by schools. Often described as ‘school-based’ or ‘community based’
management, the devolution of decision-making authority to schools includes a wide variety of
models and mechanisms. These diﬀer in terms of which decisions are devolved (and how many), to
whom decision-making authority is given and how the decentralisation process is implemented
(that is, through ‘top- down’ or ‘bottom-up’ processes).
‘School-based decision-making’ can describe models in which decisions are taken by an indivi-
dual principal or head teacher, by a professional management committee within a school or by a
management committee involving local community members. This last model may simply imply an
increased role for parents in the management and activities of the school, or it may include
provision of training and materials to empower broader community involvement, depending on
the model (Krishnaratne, White, and Carpenter 2013).
The devolved decisions can be ﬁnancial (for example, decisions about how resources should be
allocated within a school; decisions about raising funds for particular activities within a school),
managerial (for example, human resource decisions, such as the monitoring of teacher perfor-
mance and the power to hire and ﬁre teachers; decisions relating to the management of school
buildings and other infrastructure) or related to the curriculum and/or pedagogy (for example,
decisions about how elements of a national curriculum will be taught and assessed within a given
school). In order to support the process of decision-making, many models also involve some means
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of providing information to community members on the performance of an individual school (or
school district) relative to other schools (Barrera-Osorio and Linden 2009). These models and
mechanisms are considered to potentially increase accountability and responsiveness to local
needs by bringing local community members into more direct contact with schools, and to
increase eﬃciency by making ﬁnancial decisions more transparent to communities, thereby redu-
cing corruption and incentivising investment in high-quality teachers and materials.
For the purposes of this review, ‘school-based decision-making’ is deﬁned as including any
model in which at least some of the responsibility for making decisions about planning, manage-
ment and/or the raising or allocation of resources is located within schools and their proximal
institutions (for example, community organisations), as opposed to government authorities at the
central, regional or district level. The ‘intervention’ considered within this review, therefore, is any
reform in which decision-making authority is devolved to the level of the school. Within this broad
deﬁnition, there are three main mechanisms discussed in the literature: (1) reforms that devolve
decision-making around management to the school level; (2) reforms that devolve decision-making
around funding to the school level and (3) reforms that devolve decision-making around curriculum,
pedagogy and other aspects of the classroom environment to the school level.
School-based decision-making is widely promoted by donors in lower-income countries as a
means for improving educational quality and is often taken up enthusiastically by national
governments. Both generally articulate the ultimate outcome of school-based decision-making
models as being a positive change in student outcomes (including but not restricted to learning
outcomes). In addition to learning outcomes (most often measured by standardised tests of
cognitive skills), there are many other possible student learning outcomes which may be valued
by schools, donors and governments, such as improved student ability to demonstrate psychoso-
cial and ‘non-cognitive’ skills. Changes in student aspirations, attitudes and behaviours (such as the
adoption of safe sex practices) could also be considered important educational outcomes.
However, devolving decision-making to the level of the school does not lead directly to such
outcomes. Rather, school-based decision-making is likely to impact on outcomes through a
number of causal pathways. We developed a conceptual framework depicting our understanding
of the causal pathways, contributing factors and underlying processes that could aﬀect the impact
of school-based decision-making on educational outcomes (Figure 1), which we used as a ‘working
hypothesis’ (Oliver, Dickson, and Newman 2012, 68) to guide the articulation of our speciﬁc review
questions and review methodology (as recommended by Anderson et al. 2011).
Reforms that increase accountability and responsiveness to local needs are assumed to lead to
positive stakeholder perceptions of (and engagement in) educational provision, which, in turn, is
expected to increase enrolment, attendance and retention and to reduce corruption within
schools. It is also presumed that increased accountability will encourage schools to make recruit-
ment decisions based on teacher performance, rather than mechanically relying on qualiﬁcations or
allowing nepotism to interfere. Such personnel practices, in turn, are seen to lead to reduced
teacher absenteeism, increased teacher motivation and, ultimately, improvements in the quality of
teaching within schools. It is also assumed that local communities will encourage schools to adopt
more locally relevant curricula, which can then have a positive impact on the quality of teaching
and student opportunities to learn.
At the same time, decentralised funding mechanisms and other reforms aimed at increasing
eﬃciency within schools, particularly when combined with eﬀorts to increase community partici-
pation, are presumed to result in more resources being available to schools, another important
factor in improving educational quality (Krishnaratne, White, and Carpenter 2013). Increased
eﬃciency is, in turn, assumed to aﬀect the unit costs of educational provision, potentially reducing
costs or improving outcomes for a given cost, which may be particularly valued by governments in
less well-resourced settings. School-based decision-making mechanisms, therefore, result in many
proximal (or intermediate) outcomes, in addition to the ﬁnal outcomes mentioned above. These
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proximal outcomes include increased enrolment, improved equality of access, improved atten-
dance, improved retention, improved progression and higher quality educational provision.
However, there is growing evidence that decentralisation reforms may have unintended and
sometimes negative eﬀects in certain political and economic circumstances (Banerjee et al. 2008;
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005; Carr-Hill et al. 1999; Condy 1998;
Glassman, Naidoo, and Wood 2007; Pherali, Smith, and Vaux 2011; Rocha Menocal and Sharma
2008; Rose 2003; Unterhalter 2012). Decentralising decision-making may lead to ‘elite capture’ at
the local level and/or further corruption within school systems, for example, or may limit educa-
tional opportunity for marginalised ethnic groups. There is some consensus in this literature that
decentralisation is only likely to have a positive impact on outcomes when (a) there is clear
government policy and/or regulations about the powers and role played by diﬀerent agencies
and stakeholders; (b) there are suﬃcient ﬁnancial resources available within the system and (c)
there is some form of democratic culture (see De Grauwe et al. 2005; Lugaz et al. 2010; Pherali,
Smith, and Vaux 2011). Those vested with the authority to make decisions on behalf of the school
must also have the capacity and knowledge to make such decisions, or their decisions are unlikely
to have a positive impact on outcomes (World Bank 2004). This body of evidence highlights the
contingency of the eﬀects of decentralisation, linked to important interactions between formal
structures of decision-making and informal structures of power and authority within bureaucracies,
communities and schools.
Furthermore, each link in the causal chain rests on certain assumptions which must be met for a
change in the location of decision-making to have the desired eﬀect(s). For instance, the assertion
that involving parents and community members in the hiring and ﬁring of teachers (an ‘account-
ability’ mechanism employed in many contexts) will improve quality of teaching rests on the
assumption that (a) parents and community members will be able to identify high-quality teachers
who should be retained and/or rewarded, (b) the incentives provided will positively impact student
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework.
Source: authors.
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learning and (c) former more centralised systems were less than optimal with regard to teacher
recruitment and accountability, leaving scope for improvement through reform. This is not always
achieved. In some contexts, teacher incentive schemes have been found to have a negative impact
on overall student learning, if, for instance, they create perverse incentives for teachers to block the
enrolment of low-performing students to maintain high average test scores within their classrooms
(Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer 2003). The impact of school-based decision-making models is, therefore,
likely to diﬀer depending on a wide variety of implementation factors, relating to the objective of
the reform, the decisions that are devolved, the individuals given decision-making authority and
the nature of the decision-making process.
Objectives and methods
The review aims to answer two questions:
(1) What are the impacts of school-based decision-making on educational outcomes in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs)?
(2) What are the barriers to and enablers of eﬀective models of school-based decision-making?
The review followed an explicit protocol (see Carr-Hill et al. 2014). Full details of the review
approach are provided by Carr-Hill, Rolleston, and Schendel (2016).
To be included in the review, all studies had to: (1) be empirical in nature and focused on
primary and secondary schools within LMICs2; (2) investigate a change in decision-making authority
from a higher level of decision-making authority to the level of the school; (3) provide data on the
relationship between school-based decision-making and at least one educational outcome (either
proximal, for example, attrition, equality of access, increased enrolment or ﬁnal, for example,
student learning, as captured by test scores, psychosocial and non-cognitive skills, and so forth)
and (4) rely on data collected since 1990 be reported in English, French, Spanish or Portuguese.3
Studies of any follow-up duration and studies with multiple follow-ups were included.
We excluded evidence collected in LMICs located within Central and Eastern Europe (including
Turkey) or the former USSR, and studies where the intervention was conceptualised, managed and
implemented by an external decision-making agency. Studies of interventions aimed exclusively at
improving the functioning of devolved decision-making structures – but not introducing new
decision-making authority – were excluded (for example, interventions aimed at strengthening
the eﬀectiveness of pre-existing village education committees, such as the report card initiative
discussed by Banerjee et al. 2008). We also excluded studies investigating a change in decision-
making authority to a level higher than the school (for example, studies of decentralisation to the
region or district level). Studies that investigated the eﬀects of privatisation of schooling were
excluded on a related basis. Further, studies focusing on decision-making at levels lower than the
school were also excluded. These include demand-side interventions (for example, conditional cash
transfers) intended to inﬂuence decisions made at the household, family or child-level.
We conducted a mixed methods review. To be eligible for review under RQ1, studies needed to
be causal in nature, meaning we included: (1) experimental designs using randomised or quasi-
randomised assignment and (2) quasi-experimental designs collecting longitudinal data at baseline
and endline in intervention and comparison groups, as well as those using cross-sectional endline
data only, provided an appropriate method of analysis has been used to control for confounding.
Any comparison needed to be contemporaneous – that is, data on a reform group and a non-
reform group needed to reﬂect the same time period. All the included studies needed to analyse
data at the level of the child or at the level of the school or community. Studies analysing
comparison groups at sub-national or country level were excluded, as were studies in which
there was clear evidence of spillovers or contamination to comparison groups from the same
communities, and studies in which reporting biases were evident were excluded.4
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For RQ2, we included studies of any empirical design, so long as they provided evidence on
contexts already included in the review, and met the standards of transparency, appropriateness,
rigour, validity, reliability and cogency set out by DFID (2014). These included ‘process evaluations’
and/or project completion reports of any of the school-based decision-making interventions
evaluated in reference to the ﬁrst review question, other empirical studies (employing quantitative,
qualitative or mixed methods of analysis) which provided data on either factors found to aﬀect the
implementation of one of the school-based decision-making interventions evaluated in reference
to the ﬁrst review question, or conditions or circumstances found to aﬀect the impact of one of the
included interventions on the speciﬁed outcome(s). Studies reporting stakeholder perceptions of a
change in outcomes were excluded, as were studies exclusively reporting on processes or outputs
(for example, changes in the frequency of community participation).
Potentially relevant literature was identiﬁed through a ﬁve-stage search strategy for published
literature (for example, journal articles, books, conference papers and institutional grey literature,
including reports and process evaluations) and unpublished literature (for example, dissertations,
theses and unpublished empirical studies showing null and/or negative results). This comprised: (1)
identiﬁcation of existing systematic reviews in related areas; (2) targeted searches in a wide range
of bibliographic databases and websites5; (3) hand searches of the eight most relevant journals
relating to the topic; (4) citation chasing6 and (5) contacting experts involved in the research area.
Relevant studies were then appraised for robustness of evidence and methodological rigour prior
to synthesis.
We identiﬁed 2821 titles (135 from systematic reviews, 2141 from databases and 541 from
website and hand searches)7 of which 100 met the review eligibility criteria (Figure 2). A total of 30
of the 100 met the design criteria required for RQ1, but three were removed from RQ1 synthesis,
due to high risk of bias.8 A total of 27 studies were, therefore, included in the review of which 26
studies, investigating the impact of 17 individual interventions, were included in meta-analysis.9 A
total of 23 non-causal studies were identiﬁed and critically appraised, of which 9 were included.
Figure 2. Pipeline of studies.
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We created a typology of broad intervention types, based on typologies of school- based
management models included by Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009) and Santibanez (2007). The typology
was created by coding each study on a range of dimensions, based on elements of our initial
conceptual framework, from which we identiﬁed three broad intervention types:
(1) High decentralisation (4 interventions), comprising all models in which the school (and/or the
local community) has decision-making authority over nearly all aspects of school manage-
ment. Most importantly, the school or school management committee needed to have
authority over both ﬁnancial and personnel decisions (for example, the authority to hire/
ﬁre teachers and the authority to pay salaries).
(2) Medium decentralisation (13 interventions), in which a school or school management com-
mittee needed to have authority over some management decisions. However, schools in this
classiﬁcation would not have authority over personnel decisions.
(3) Low decentralisation (1 intervention) includes models in which schools have the power to
make curricular decisions and/or decisions about infrastructure and buildings. No schools in
this classiﬁcation have authority over ﬁnancial decisions.
We calculated standardised mean diﬀerences (SMDs) and associated standard errors from studies
to compare eﬀects across studies. SMD provides an estimate of the change in outcomes between
intervention and control/comparison groups measured in the standard deviation (SD) of the
outcome of interest. It is therefore comparable across studies, subject to certain assumptions.10
Standardised mean diﬀerences are scaled naturally so that, for example, an eﬀect size estimate of
0.10 denotes one-tenth of a SD improvement for treatment participants compared to control
participants.
We estimated pooled eﬀect sizes using random eﬀects meta-analysis models with inverse
variance weights. We explored heterogeneity across studies and within studies, given the variation
in samples, interventions, countries and study design methods. Finally, in order to identify the main
barriers and enablers that appear to have inﬂuenced the impact of the interventions in particular
contexts, we examined within-study ﬁndings using a framework synthesis approach (Thomas,
Harden, and Newman 2012).
Description of included interventions
In total, the 35 included studies investigate the eﬀectiveness of 17 individual interventions
(Table 1). Many of the 26 included impact studies (RQ1) involve multiple ‘treatment’ arms, each
reﬂecting a slightly diﬀerent variation of school-based decision-making. Of the nine linked studies
(RQ2), seven relate to four of the interventions investigated in the impact studies and the remain-
ing two are multi-country studies (Gunnarsson et al. 2008; Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann 2011).
The studies represent a diversity of geographic contexts. The region most heavily represented is
Latin America (n = 12), with Mexico (n = 5), El Salvador (n = 3) and Nicaragua (n = 2) being the most
common individual countries, and Colombia and Honduras are also represented. This is unsurpris-
ing, given that Latin American countries were amongst the ﬁrst lower income contexts to attempt
to decentralise their education systems. Seven of the studies investigate school-based decision-
making in sub-Saharan African contexts (Kenya, Madagascar, Gambia, Niger and Uganda). No
African country featured in more than two studies. Finally, seven studies analyse South or
Southeast Asian contexts, with the Philippines being the most frequent (n = 5). Other Asian
countries include Indonesia and Sri Lanka.
The studies are also quite diverse in terms of income classiﬁcation. Of the 26 impact studies, 8
were based on low-income contexts, 13 in lower middle-income contexts and 5 in upper middle-
income contexts. Most of the studies investigated interventions targeted at primary schools
(n = 23) or secondary level (n = 1), while two studies considered outcomes at both primary and
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secondary level. A total of 9 studies (32%) used randomisation to assign participants to groups,
while 17 (65%) use quasi-experimental approaches. Although the included studies represent a
range of publication dates (from 1999 to 2014), all the studies using random allocation have been
published since 2008.
Only six of the studies (23%) were published as articles in academic journals; the majority
(N = 16, 62%) are World Bank reports or working papers published by economic think tanks. Three
of the included studies were published as chapters in one World Bank publication. One is an
unpublished PhD thesis. The implication of this is that about two-thirds of our included studies are
reports which may never have been through an external peer review process. The risk of bias
assessment indicated that eight studies (27%) could be classiﬁed as of low risk of bias overall. All of
these studies were assessed as having used randomised assignment appropriately and we were not
able to identify any sources of bias relating to factors such as method of allocation, attrition,
contamination, motivation bias or biases in analysis reporting. Most other studies (63%), including
three randomised control trials (RCTs)s, were classiﬁed as having moderate risk of bias, usually due
to risks of confounding and/or contamination of comparison groups. As mentioned above, three
studies (10%) were assessed as having high risk of bias and were excluded from the meta-analysis.
Results of overall synthesis
We were able to report on the impact of any school-based decision-making reform on six educa-
tional outcomes: (1) student dropout and attendance; (2) student repetition; (3) teacher atten-
dance; and (4) student learning, as assessed through (i) language test scores, (ii) math test scores,
(iii) aggregate test scores (that is, tests of more than one subject).
Drop-out
Figure 3. Eﬀects on student dropout.
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Student drop out and attendance
Seven of the 10 estimates of eﬀects of devolving decision-making to the level of the school on
school-level student dropouts are from Latin America. All except two of the 10 estimates are
negative and two in Colombia and Mexico are statistically signiﬁcant (Figure 3). Pooling the
ﬁndings across studies, we estimate a somewhat beneﬁcial eﬀect on school-level student dropouts
– a pooled eﬀect of reducing dropout by 0.07 SDs but not statistically signiﬁcant at 95 per cent
conﬁdence (95% CI = −0.14, 0.01).
However, there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the ﬁndings across studies (I-squared = 88%) and
evidence in some contexts does suggest statistically signiﬁcant reductions in dropouts. For exam-
ple, Rodriguez, Sanchez and Armenta (2010) estimate the biggest reduction in Colombia (−0.23
SMD; 95% CI = −0.27,–0.19).
Six also reported eﬀects on student absenteeism or attendance (Barr et al. 2012; Blimpo and
Evans 2011; Di Gropello and Marshall 2005; Jimenez and Sawada 1999; Lassibille et al. 2010; and
Sawada and Ragatz 2005). However, none included suﬃcient data to allow for the calculation of
SMDs and subsequent pooling in meta-analysis. Two studies measure absenteeism by collecting
data on student attendance on the day of an unannounced visit to a school. Barr et al. (2012)
estimate that using a participatory process for developing and using a school report card increased
attendance by up to 10 per cent, while Blimpo and Evans (2011) estimate that the Whole School
Development intervention reduced student absenteeism by about 5 percentage points from a base
of about 23 per cent. However, Jimenez and Sawada (2003) and Sawada and Ragatz (2005), who
deﬁne absenteeism as the number of days absent in the previous month among students in the
3rd grade, ﬁnd no diﬀerence between EDUCO and traditional schools in overall mean absence. Di
Gropello and Marshall (2005), who use a student-reported ordinal measure of attendance, ﬁnd no
evidence that PROHECO schools succeeded in reducing student absences. Lassibille et al. (2010),
meanwhile, measure attendance across a given school during the month prior to a visit identify an
increase in attendance of approximately 4 percentage points over control schools in schools which
Repetition
Figure 4. Eﬀects on repetition.
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beneﬁted from interventions at the school level but no eﬀect in districts implementing only the
sub-district- and district-level version of the intervention.
Figure 5. Eﬀects on teacher attendance.
Aggregate Test Score
Figure 6. Eﬀects on aggregate test scores.
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Student repetition, failure and progression
For repetition, the pooled eﬀect of the impact of a school-based decision-making intervention is a
reduction in school-level repetition rates of 0.09 SDs (95%CI = −0.13, −0.04) (Figure 4). Three of the
ﬁve estimates are from Latin America, one is from Madagascar and one from Indonesia. All but one
of the individual study estimates are negative, while only two in Madagascar and Mexico are
signiﬁcant at the 95 per cent level. Analysis does not suggest heterogeneity is signiﬁcant across
studies (I-squared = 18%), suggesting the ﬁndings are consistent across contexts.
Five studies also investigated impacts on student failure rates all in Mexico (Bando 2010; Gertler,
Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012; Murnane, Willett, and Cardenas 2006; Rodriguez, Sanchez, and
Armenta 2010; Skouﬁas and Shapiro 2006). However, in none of these studies is failure precisely
deﬁned, in terms of which subjects are included in the assessment of a student’s failure at the end
of a year.
Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina (2012) estimate a signiﬁcant reduction in grade failure for
AGE, a ﬁnding which is robust to checks on pre-intervention trends between treatment and
comparison schools. Rodriguez, Sanchez, and Armenta (2010) also identify a reduction of 1.4
percentage points in PER schools over control schools. Three studies examine failure rates for
the programme succeeding AGE, PEC (Murnane, Willett, and Cardenas 2006; Skouﬁas and Shapiro
2006; Bando 2010), ﬁnding mixed results. Skouﬁas and Shapiro (2006) estimated participation in
PEC to reduce failure rates by 0.24 percentage points, while Murnane, Willett, and Cardenas (2006)
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argue PEC schools were more successful than control schools in retaining many students. On the
other hand, Bando (2010), using census data in her analysis, suggests a positive association with
failure rates that strengthens over time.
Two studies also investigated impacts on student progression and/or continuation (Barr et al.
2012; Jimenez and Sawada 2003), oﬀering discrepant ﬁndings. Barr et al. (2012) found no impact on
the probability of continued enrolment, as a result of the participatory scorecard intervention.
However, Jimenez and Sawada (2003) identify an increase in continuation in EDUCO schools than
others.
Teacher attendance
Figure 5 reports results from seven studies that measure the impact of a school-based decision-
making intervention on teacher attendance. Five estimates are from Africa and the other two from
Latin America and Asia. Evidence suggests eﬀects on teacher attendance are positive overall, at
0.10 SD, but not statistically signiﬁcant (95% CI = −0.05, 0.26). Analysis suggests there is signiﬁcant
heterogeneity in the estimates (I-squared = 72%). Indeed, two studies in Kenya and Uganda found
signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on teacher attendance.
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Test scores
Eﬀects on test scores are larger and more robust. We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant improvement of
0.21 SDs in aggregate test scores11 on average (95% CI = 0.09, 0.32) (Figure 6). The ﬁve estimates of
aggregate test scores come from two countries (one from Kenya and four from the Philippines, all
of which use the same test data). Two are positive and signiﬁcant (both in the Philippines) with
SMD around 0.3, and none is negative and signiﬁcant.
We also ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant average improvements of around 0.08 SD in scores on
mathematics (95% CI = 0.02, 0.13) (Figure 7) and language (SMD = 0.07, 95% CI = 0.02, 0.13)
(Figure 8). The 19 estimates for mathematics tests come from a range of contexts (Africa, Asia and
Latin America). Only one estimate is negative and signiﬁcant, while ﬁve, from a variety of contexts,
are positive and signiﬁcant – SMD exceeds 0.2 in Sri Lanka, Kenya and the Philippines. There is
signiﬁcant heterogeneity in eﬀects (I-squared = 69%) suggesting further moderator analysis is
needed to explain diﬀerences between studies. The 17 estimates for language tests12 are from
Asia, Africa and Latin America. Six of the 17 estimates are positive and signiﬁcant, with SMD
exceeding 0.2 in Indonesia, Kenya, Sri Lanka and in one Mexico study, while none is negative and
signiﬁcant. The analysis suggests signiﬁcant residual heterogeneity (I-squared = 62%), which is
explored further in moderator analysis.
Adverse outcomes
Devolving decisions to the level of the school can have negative consequences, such as elite
capture and disharmony between ethnic groups. Two impact evaluations reported unintended
consequences of school-based decision-making reforms. Murnane, Willett, and Cardenas (2006)
identiﬁed a signiﬁcant increase in the administrative burden on schools as a result of the PEC
programme in Mexico. Duﬂo, Dupas, and Kremer (2012) note that school management committees
in Kenya seemed to be more likely to hire male teachers than females.
Results of moderator and sub-group analyses
We conducted moderator analysis for variables which we believed are likely to aﬀect the impact of
school-based decision-making reforms: the level of decentralisation (high, medium or low) and the
country income level (Table 2).13 The results do not suggest consistent diﬀerences across outcomes
for decentralisation categories, possibly due to the small numbers of observations by moderator
variable groups.
The cross-country study by Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann (2011) found that the impact of
school autonomy depends on the level of development of the country implementing the reform.
Our own moderator analysis does not suggest eﬀects diﬀer by income group for dropouts and
teacher attendance, despite evidence for the latter being dominated by studies from low-income
countries where issues relating to teacher attendance may be particularly acute. However, analysis
of test scores does suggest impacts pertaining to middle-income countries for mathematics and
language, where the overall positive pooled eﬀect is driven by the results for lower-middle income
countries (0.09 SMD; 95% CI = 0.03, 0.16). By contrast, and with the exception of one study in Kenya
(Duﬂo, Dupas, and Kremer (2012), now a middle-income country, there is no signiﬁcant improve-
ment in student learning in low-income country settings (SMD = 0.01 SMD; 95% CI = −0.09, 0.11).
We examined the possibility impact heterogeneity depending on the length of exposure to the
reforms under investigation. Evidence from the US suggests that there can be a time lag of up to eight
years between the implementation of a school-based management model and any observable impact
on student test scores, although intermediate eﬀects may be more rapidly identiﬁable (World Bank
2007, p. 13). This could be because schools initially see a decline in performance as school personnel
adapt to the new structures, or because school-based management reforms are likely to have a more
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immediate impact on proximal outcomes (for example, teacher attendance), which then have a more
gradual impact on student learning over time. Seven of the studies do explicitly include time-lag in
heterogeneity analysis, and present inconsistent evidence. Some studies (for example, Duﬂo, Dupas,
and Kremer 2012; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012; Jimenez and Sawada 1999; and Santibañez,
Abreu-Lastra, and O’Donoghue 2014) identify a possible ‘Hawthorne eﬀect’, whereby schools show
positive results in the ﬁrst year (possibly due to the energy andmomentum created by the new reform),
which do not continue to increase with prolonged exposure. A similar eﬀect is identiﬁed by Khattri,
Ling., and Jha (2010) and Yamauchi (2014), although neither study explicitly presents data on this point.
However, other studies (for example, Bando 2010; King and Ozler 2005; Murnane, Willett, and Cardenas
2006) identify stronger results in communities with longer exposure to the intervention. As studies in
both groups examine similar outcomes, it is diﬃcult to draw any conclusions around the diﬀerential
impact of length of exposure.
We also explored the correlation between the time-lag between the start of the intervention
and the impacts observed for test scores, where there were suﬃcient observations to examine
variation by follow-up time, using meta-regression analysis (Table 3). The meta-regression also
conditions on country income status and suggests that it may take on average 22 months for
reforms to have a maximum eﬀect of 0.16 SD in middle-income country contexts. This suggests
results from shorter term follow-ups may be biased downward, if we are to believe indirect
treatment comparisons across contexts.
Almost half of the studies, covering 14 interventions, examined impact heterogeneity according
to the following factors:
● student-level factors including baseline ability (Pradhan et al. 2011), sex (Pradhan et al. 2011),
socio-economic background (Rodriguez, Sanchez, and Armenta 2010) and grade level
(Beasley and Huillery 2014; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012; King and Ozler 2005;
Parker 2005; Rodriguez, Sanchez, and Armenta 2010; Santibañez, Abreu-Lastra, and
O’Donoghue 2014);
● school-level factors including school size (Beasley and Huillery 2014; King and Ozler 2005) and
characteristics of teachers (Glewwe and Maïga 2011; Barr et al. 2012; Jimenez and Sawada 2003;
Duﬂo, Dupas, and Kremer 2012) and head teachers (Rodriguez, Sanchez, and Armenta 2010);
● community-level factors including the level of community disadvantage (Gertler, Patrinos, and
Rubio-Codina 2012; Murnane, Willett, and Cardenas 2006; Rodriguez, Sanchez, and Armenta
2010; Skouﬁas and Shapiro 2006), education levels of parents and school management
committee members (Beasley and Huillery 2014; Blimpo and Evans 2011) and the level of
community participation (Jimenez and Sawada 1999; King and Ozler 2005);
● national-level factors including one study examining a sub-group of teachers under a cen-
tralised pay-for-performance scheme that rewarded teachers for strong results on student
assessments (Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012) and
● co-interventions such as training (Blimpo and Evans 2011; Bold et al. 2013; Duﬂo, Dupas, and
Kremer 2012; Pradhan et al. 2011), accountability mechanisms like report cards (World Bank
2011; Barr et al. 2012), the election of school management committees (Pradhan et al. 2011)
and whether the implementing body is government or NGO (Bold et al. 2013; Glewwe and
Maïga 2011; Lassibille et al. 2010).14
Implementation ﬁdelity was also discussed to a very limited extent (Pradhan et al. 2011; Blimpo and
Evans 2011; Bold et al. 2013; Yamauchi 2014) but not in formal sub-group analysis.
The ﬁndings from these analyses varied across contexts, and are reported in full elsewhere (Carr-
Hill, Rolleston, and Schendel 2016). Brieﬂy, there is some evidence to suggest that school-based
decision-making reforms have a stronger impact on wealthier students with more educated
parents. It also appears that reforms may be particularly eﬀective for lower grade levels. By
contrast, reforms appear to be less eﬀective in disadvantaged communities, particularly if parents
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and community members have low levels of education and low status relative to school personnel.
This is a particularly important result, given that some studies showing positive impacts explicitly
acknowledged having avoided including more remote areas in their analysis (for example, Glewwe
and Maïga 2011; and Lassibille et al. 2010). Devolution also appears to be ineﬀective when
communities are not able to participate actively in decision-making processes. Small schools,
however, may ﬁnd school-based decision-making to be eﬀective, particularly if community mem-
bers establish a collaborative, rather than an adversarial, relationship with teachers. Two studies in
particular (Jimenez and Sawada 1999; King and Ozler 2005), both investigating programmes in
Latin America, conclude that community participation levels are critical.
Barriers to and enablers of eﬀective school-based decision making
This section draws on ﬁndings from impact evaluations and the linked studies, which were critically
appraised prior to synthesis (Table A1). The ﬁnding that devolving decisions to the school level
does not have a positive eﬀect on the poorest, most disadvantaged communities, is supported by
qualitative evidence from Nicaragua. Fuller and Rivarola (1998) found that schools in severely
impoverished areas were unlikely to raise additional revenue from the surrounding communities.
Gershberg and Meade (2005) found parental contributions to be a signiﬁcant component of
autonomous school budgets, suggesting that disadvantaged communities would be unable to
raise suﬃcient resources under the autonomous schools model.
Low levels of capacity within communities are also barriers. Communities with high levels of
illiteracy and/or with few educated parents do not seem to beneﬁt from devolution of decisions to
the community level. In their study of Whole School Development programme in the Gambia,
Blimpo and Evans (2011) argue that devolution may even be detrimental in such contexts ‘because
the communities are not well equipped to act on [such information]’ (p. 29).
The cross-country study by Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann (2011) ﬁnds autonomy reforms
improve student achievement in more developed countries but may undermine it in less devel-
oped ones. Reimers and Cardenas (2007), in analysis of Mexico’s PEC programme, ﬁnd that lack of
leadership or ‘coherence of vision among school staﬀ’ are signiﬁcant barriers (p. 38). Teachers in
Indonesia felt they did not have the capacity to implement the curricular component of that
country’s school-based management reform points, nor did they feel adequately supported to use
the autonomy given to them (Bjork 2003).
There are a variety of reasons why the capacity of institutions and communities can act as a
barrier to eﬀective school-based decision-making reforms. First, for such reforms to be eﬀective,
school personnel and community members must understand the nature of the reform and crucially
must also be able to propose changes that are likely to aﬀect student learning within the school.
Santibañez, Abreu-Lastra, and O’Donoghue (2014) and Parker (2005) note that communities in
Mexico and Nicaragua did not always fully grasp the nature and the objective of school-based
decision-making reforms. Bandur (2008) raises similar concerns in analysis of the national school-
based management reform in Indonesia. In the Nicaraguan context, the lack of ownership led to
active resistance in some communities (Fuller and Rivarola 1998).
Beasley and Huillery (2014) found that school management committees in rural communities in
Niger frequently opted to spend their grants on agricultural projects, instead of school materials,
teacher incentives or other initiatives likely to aﬀect educational outcomes. Secondly, community
members – particularly parents – must have a certain amount of status to play an active role on
school management committees. This does not tend to be the situation in rural, poor communities,
where school personnel are often perceived as authority ﬁgures due to their relatively high levels
of education (Beasley and Huillery 2014; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2012). All of these
reasons may explain why early interventions devolving decisions to the school level, such as
EDUCO in El Salvador, restricted participation in school management decisions to literate members
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of the community, a requirement which does not appear to feature in similar models of school-
based management implemented more recently in other low-income contexts.
Under-resourced governments may simply be unable to implement and monitor complex
decentralisation reforms. Bold et al. (2013) ﬁnds that a contract teacher programme, which was
eﬀective under NGO implementation, had no eﬀect when scaled up by the government at the
national level. Lassibille et al. (2010) and Glewwe and Maïga (2011) ﬁnd impacts among schools
beneﬁting from direct training by NGO representatives in Madagascar, but not among schools that
had been trained by district or sub-district employees (who had themselves been trained by the
NGO). National-level programmes unlikely to be eﬀective without suﬃcient monitoring capacity
and accountability mechanisms, both of which are often limited in low-income contexts. Indeed,
there may be reason to suspect that government oﬃcials may actively hinder the eﬀectiveness of
school-based management reforms, as was identiﬁed by both Bandur (2008) and Vernez, Karam,
and Marshall (2012) in Indonesia, where provincial and district oﬃcials were found to actively
interfere in school decision-making processes.
Finally, the studies highlight the fact that school-based decision-making reforms can only aﬀect
the immediate circumstances of a given school or community. Even if a reform is eﬀective within a
community, school-based management reforms cannot address many external factors that can act
as signiﬁcant barriers to impact. Although there are myriad external factors aﬀecting educational
outcomes, the included studies reference ﬁve that appear most relevant:
● The strength of the national teacher’s union (Bold et al. 2013);
● The strength of the teacher job market (Barr et al. 2012; Parker 2005);
● Teacher ability/quality (Lassibille et al. 2010; Blimpo and Evans 2011);
● Constraints imposed by the central system, for example, ineﬃcient mechanisms for distribut-
ing salaries in rural areas (Blimpo and Evans 2011; Lassibille et al. 2010) and
● Security (Beasley and Huillery 2014).
Studies also point to several enablers of eﬀective school-based decision-making reforms. First, it
appears that smaller schools (for example, one-teacher schools as in Beasley and Huillery 2014) are
more likely to beneﬁt from local decision-making authority, because it is easier for school manage-
ment committees to monitor teachers and stay informed about conditions at the school. Second,
devolving personnel decisions and ﬁnancial and other management decisions enables school-
based decision-makers to aﬀect teacher behaviour, including attendance (Sawada and Ragatz
2005; King and Ozler 2005). Finally, Duﬂo, Dupas, and Kremer (2012) suggest that giving parents
the majority voting power on school management committees in Kenya was one of the reasons
why local hiring addressed issues of elite capture.
Discussion
We report the ﬁrst mixed-methods systematic review of school-based management. The included
studies were systematically critical appraised and met the criteria for relatively low risk of bias.
Our ﬁndings are broadly similar to other comprehensive reviews of evidence (for example,
Santibanez 2007; World Bank 2007). However, we oﬀer a body of evidence substantially bigger in
size and geographic breadth than these reviews, hence adding to the generalisability of the
evidence. Our review includes 26 impact studies and 9 qualitative studies, representing 17 distinct
interventions in 13 countries across Latin America (5 countries), sub-Saharan Africa (5 countries)
and South/Southeast Asia (3 countries).
Overall, we ﬁnd that devolving decision-making to the level of the school appears to have a
positive eﬀect on repetition and beneﬁcial eﬀects on reducing dropouts and improving teacher
attendance in certain contexts. Eﬀects on test scores are more robust, and range between 0.10 and
0.20 SD. In comparative terms, these eﬀects may be considered sizeable when compared to the
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balance of results for educational interventions, not least because eﬀect sizes in the ﬁeld of
education tend to be relatively small and eﬀect sizes approaching 0.2 SMD are comparatively
large (Snilstveit et al., 2016). In broader terms, reported eﬀects on learning outcomes vary widely
but are often small and/or statistically non-signiﬁcant. Kremer, Brannen, and Glennerster (2013)
review a number of RCTs which employ test scores as outcomes and ﬁnd that, very exceptionally,
eﬀect sizes can be as high as 0.6 SD (providing village schools in Afghanistan), while more generally
an eﬀect 0.2 SD can be considered large.
There is also much heterogeneity in eﬀects. Evidence suggests that school-based decision-
making reforms appear to be less eﬀective in disadvantaged communities, particularly if parents
and community members have low levels of education and low status relative to school personnel.
In models of school-based decision-making classiﬁed as ‘high’ decentralisation, schools and
communities have decision-making authority over nearly all aspects of school management. Most
importantly, the school (or, typically, the school management committee) has authority over both
ﬁnancial and personnel decisions, including the authority to hire/ﬁre teachers and to pay salaries. As
is evident from the studies examining the impact of diﬀerential levels of participation on outcomes,
devolving decision-making to school level does not always result in increased stakeholder participa-
tion in school activities. However, when participation does increase – and when school management
committees have the authority to hire and ﬁre teachers – the evidence suggests that teacher
attendance improves (Figure A1). We know less about how this may translate into student learning.
In fact, improved teacher attendance does not appear to result in increased teacher eﬀort or
improved quality of teaching in many contexts. The link between teacher attendance and student
learning is likely to depend on several other external factors, including teacher ability, community
characteristics and the speciﬁc design of the school-based decision-making reform.
In ‘medium’ decentralisation models, schools have authority over non-personnel ﬁnancial deci-
sions. This authority usually comprises oversight of grants related to School Improvement Plans and/
or the school budget, as well as legal authority to raise independent monies on behalf of the school.
There is evidence to suggest that devolving ﬁnancial decisions to the school level often results in an
increased amount of money available to the school, either due to the receipt of a grant or to the
fundraising activities of school management committees. However, increased funding does not
appear to translate into educational outcomes, particularly in poorer communities (Figure A2).
Implications for policy, practice and research
Our ﬁndings carry several implications for policy and practice. First, it appears that school-based
decision-making reforms in highly disadvantaged communities are less likely to be successful.
Parental participation seems the key to the success of such reforms and this is linked to the real
authority or status and cultural capital of community members. One benchmark, proposed by Blimpo
and Evans (2011), is that communities need aminimumof 45 per cent overall literacy in order to beneﬁt
from school-based management. This suggests that policymakers are likely to see greater impact of
school-management reforms in more advantaged areas, although this raises obvious equity concerns.
Second, the involvement of school management committees in personnel decisions appears to
play a role in improving proximal outcomes, such as teacher attendance. However, the impact of
devolving personnel decisions is also likely to be linked to the overall teacher job market and the
possibility of long-term employment. Policy proposals should therefore consider the current and
prospective job market conditions for teachers when anticipating the potential impact of school-
based decision-making reforms.
Third, the speciﬁcs of programme design appear to be crucial. It appears that the details of such
supplementary elements (for example, restrictions on the use of grants; the implementing body
responsible for training; and so forth) may play an important enabling role. The evidence also
suggests that, at least in some contexts, impact on student learning may take longer than is often
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allowed within evaluation timelines. Where donors are involved, this also means that decentralisa-
tion reforms may require sustained donor commitment over the longer term (minimum 2 years).
Finally, we suggest policymakers should proceedwith caution when using the results from small-scale
pilot programmes to inform national programming, although further research is needed on this point.
The review also suggests a number of fruitful directions for future research. There needs to be
further robust analysis of the impacts of large-scale school-based decision-making reforms that have
recently been implemented. More studies are also needed that analyse the relative impacts of diﬀerent
kinds of school-based decision-making interventions (that is, implementation RCTs with active con-
trols). The few studies with active controls (for example, Pradhan et al. 2011) oﬀer important insights
into the speciﬁc eﬀects of diﬀerent models, which should be replicated elsewhere.
We were unable to locate many studies investigating possible negative or unintended con-
sequences of school-based decision-making reforms, given that such outcomes do not feature
explicitly in any of the included impact studies. There is therefore a clear need to examine negative
eﬀects, given widespread adoption of such policies, in impact evaluations. But it would also be
possible to incorporate adverse eﬀects drawing on non-experimental studies. A future review of
school-based decision-making could expand the inclusion criteria to examine adverse eﬀects by
incorporating the full range of non-experimental and qualitative evidence. More generally, we have
identiﬁed a large amount of qualitative evidence which could also be used to synthesise a broader
range of barriers and enablers of implementation to complement the ﬁndings of this study.
This review excluded reforms which evaluated interventions designed to improve the function-
ing of existing school-based decision-making mechanisms, and studies of interventions designed
by agencies external to the school (for example, donor agencies, NGOs). A future review could
include such studies. Finally, a review of evidence on cost-eﬀectiveness would also be warranted
although this would presumably need to incorporate relevant programme documentation to
identify unit costs, since the studies we located did not provide such information.
Notes
1. A recent paper by Evans and Popova (2015) argues that divergent conclusions from systematic reviews tend
to be driven by a reliance on diﬀerent samples of research studies, which, in turn, are driven by diﬀering
criteria for inclusion. However, the sample of studies included in that review of reviews largely draws on
studies which do not use systematic methods of search, appraisal or synthesis.
2. Income classiﬁcations reﬂect the World Bank’s income classiﬁcation system. Classiﬁcations were linked to the
start date of the intervention under investigation, rather than the current classiﬁcation.
3. Studies written in other languages were excluded, unless English translations were available, as we did not
have any further linguistic ability represented within the review team.
4. We developed a risk of bias assessment tool based on ‘Suggested risk of bias criteria for EPOC reviews’
(Cochrane EPOC, 2014), with additional questions suggested by Hombrados and Waddington (2012) .
5. As existing systematic reviews (for example, Petrosino et al, 2012) have indicated a lack of relevant studies on
education decentralisation in developing countries published prior to 2000, we limited our electronic searches
to studies published in or after 2000. We did set any such data boundary for our other search methods (for
example, review of reviews).
6. We were unable to complete forward citation chasing of included studies.
7. An additional four studies were identiﬁed through reference searching and expert checking.
8. In two of the three studies (Paes de Barros & Mendonca, 1998; De Umanzor et al. 1997), we identiﬁed a
substantial risk of confounding factors inﬂuencing the impact estimates, while there was a high risk of bias
due to attrition in the ﬁnal study (Cueto et al. 2008). Other risks were also identiﬁed, including risk of
motivation bias and clustering, in one of the three studies (De Umanzor et al. 1997).
9. Carnoy et al. (2008) was excluded from meta-analysis due to missing data.
10. Comparisons of eﬀect sizes measured in standard deviations are comparisons of relative measures, requiring,
for example, assumptions concerning the distribution and measurement of a phenomenon or trait (for
example, educational performance as measured by a test) in the samples to be compared. It was not possible
in every case to calculate SMD, particularly for studies which did not report standard deviations of the
outcome variable and/or the number of observations in the study or the statistics required to compute or
estimate the standard deviation or other required statistic (for example, t, z or F statistics, p-values and
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standard errors). However, we employed appropriate methods to generate comparable eﬀect-sizes wherever
possible, including using the Campbell Collaboration online eﬀect size calculator http://www.campbellcolla
boration.org/resources/eﬀect_size_input.php.
11. Aggregated tests are multi-subject tests. The National Achievement Test in the Philippines comprises Math,
English, Filipino, Science and Social Science. The test used by Bold et al. (2013) covers only Math and English.
12. Of the 14 studies that measured the impact of a school-based decision-making intervention on student
language test scores, some reported test data for more than one language. The languages tested are usually
the language of instruction in school, where available.
13. Results of moderator analyses by type of evaluation method used (with or without randomised assignment)
and risk of bias assessment is available in the technical report (Carr-Hill, Rolleston, and Schendel 2016). The
results for RCTs and quasi-experimental studies are similar overall nor could we identify any signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the eﬀects indicated by low and medium risk of bias studies.
14. In some instances, schools were given grants for explicit purposes, for example, the hiring of contract teachers
(Blimpo and Evans 2011; Bold et al. 2013; Duﬂo, Dupas, and Kremer 2012). However, no study in the sample
was able to estimate the marginal impact of allocating grants, because all studies included a grant component
in treatment and control arms.
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Figure A1. Revised framework for personnel decisions (‘high decentralisation’).
Figure A2. Revised framework for ﬁnancial decisions (‘medium decentralisation’).
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